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ABSTRACT
The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commercial Development
Corporation represents the most recent in a line of government programs
aimed at increasing levels of Indigenous self-management and economic
self-sufficiency by involving Indigenous people in businesses. However,
the Corporation appears to mark a change from earlier programs inasmuch
as it is required to operate along strictly commercial lines and it utilises the
strategy of creating joint ventures between Indigenous and non-Indigenous
business people. This paper outlines the history of Indigenous enterprise
programs over the last 20 years, the formation of the Corporation and its
present operations. The paper argues that the Corporation's legislation
implies that it will create Indigenous entrepreneurs and business managers,
and some of the issues within the concept of Indigenous entrepreneurship
in Australia are discussed. However, the paper concludes that the
Corporation's commercial activities are constrained in part by its pursuit of
some social goals and, in summary, calls for a methodology that can
illustrate the costs of having mixed social and economic goals and which
can show whether the Corporation is indeed creating entrepreneurs as a
means of increasing levels of Indigenous self-management and economic
self-sufficiency.
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Foreword
In March 1996,1 wrote to Mr Gatjil Djekurra, Chairman of the Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander Commercial Development Corporation (CDC)
seeking Board approval that CAEPR undertake some research on the
activities and performance of the CDC. The reasons for this request
included:
• the absence of independent academic research, especially from an
economic policy perspective, on the CDC;
• a personal perception that there is a lack of knowledge about the
CDC's roles and activities in both academic and policy-making
communities;
• a growing recognition that joint venturing might be a very appropriate
and successful model to facilitate Indigenouseconomic development.
The CDC provides some key best-practice cases of joint venturing,
but again this information is not in the public arena;
• important policy issues that needed to be addressed in relation to
Indigenous economic development that might be of relevance to the
activities of the CDC. These include the most effective utilisation of
enterprise (and other public) dollars to obtain successful outcomes;
the role of employment and training programs in the enterprises
sphere; and the inter-relationships between the activities of the CDC
and other agencies like ATSIC, the Aboriginals Benefit Trust Account
(ABTA) and the Indigenous Land Corporation (ILC), but also State
and Territory agencies with a role in Indigenous economic
development; and
• the current availability of an appropriately-qualified researcher at
CAEPR, Bill Arthur, who had time to dedicate to this research.
On 1 April 1996, Mr Brian Kimmings, General Manager of the CDC
replied on behalf of the Board informing me that this proposal had been
considered, and formally approved, on 29 March 1996.
This discussion paper provides the initial findings from this research.
While highlighting issues for further research, I trust that it meets some of
the issues outlined above. CAEPR anticipates undertaking further research
on the activities and performance of the CDC.
Professor Jon Altman
Director, CAEPR
July 1996
Background
In the late 1980s, the Government introduced the Aboriginal Employment
Development Policy (AEDP), which aimed to reduce the differences in
socioeconomic status between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians
and to reduce Indigenous welfare dependency (Commonwealth of
Australia 1987). As one arguable aim of the policy is greater parity
between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians across occupational
categories, there is a requirement to increase the number of Indigenous
people who could be classified as employers and self-employed (Daly
1994; Daly 1995). Expressed in other terms, a goal of the AEDP is to
increase the number of Indigenous people in business.
Involving Indigenous people in business is not a new government strategy
for improving their socioeconomic status. Indeed, for at least 20 years the
Government has viewed commercial enterprises as a means of furthering
Indigenous self-sufficiency and to this end it has devised a number of
economic programs (Dillon 1992: 98). However, many of these earlier
business programs were marked by a singular lack of success (Office of
Evaluation and Audit (OEA) 1991). It has been claimed that this lack of
success was often due to a lack of Indigenous managerial skills and
because the programs had mixed (social and commercial) and
contradictory objectives (ibid.).
Legislation in the late 1980s also established the Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander Commercial Development Corporation (CDC), whose role
was to advance the self-management and economic self-sufficiency of
Indigenous people largely by assisting them to become owners of, or
stakeholders in, businesses and to accumulate and use a capital base for the
benefit of Indigenous people. The general tenor of the CDC's enabling
legislation is that the Corporation should operate as a commercial
development agency. This suggests an attempt on the part of the
government to encourage the CDC and, by extension, Indigenous business
people to articulate more closely with the commercial world. Importantly,
the CDC's legislation allowed it to pursue its goals by forming joint
ventures with Indigenous and non-Indigenous partners and this has been
adopted as the Corporation's major enterprise strategy (Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) 1996: 12). It is useful at this
stage of the Corporation's life to note how its goals and strategies might
differ from those of the earlier programs and to assess the success of joint
venturing to engage Indigenous people with the world of commerce.
The statutory framework
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The first national bureaucracies to deliver special programs for Indigenous
people were established in the early 1970s. They included the Department
of Aboriginal Affairs (DAA) and the Aboriginal Loans Commission
(ALG). The DAA's brief ranged from heritage to communitydevelopment,
while the ALC's was to encourage Indigenous people to purchase their own
homes and to borrow capital to establish businesses. The ALG failed to
effectively meet all the demands of its Indigenous clients or the aims of
Government policy and in 1980 it was replaced by the( Aboriginal
Development Commission (ADC). The form of development pursued by
the ADC was extremely broad, combining both economic and social
elements. For instance, the Commission was responsible for providing
concessional loans and grants for business enterprises, for land acquisition
and housing and for community infrastructure (ADC 1989).
In 1989 the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act 1989
(the Act) superseded and amalgamated the DAA and the ADC within
ATSIC. ATSIC took over all of the former DAA's functions as well as
some of the ADC's, such as providing grants to encourage community
economic initiatives and loans for housing and for commercial businesses
(ATSIC 1995: 43, 55). Although ATSIC funded business development, its
loans were concessional and the priority of its community-based economic
programs was employment generation rather than commercial success
(ibid). Therefore, ATSIC's economic programs demonstrated similar
objectives to those of the former ADC in that they included a mix of
economic and social objectives.
To provide solely commercial economic development options the Act
established the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commercial
Development Corporation whose charter (s.146) was:
i To assist and enhance Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander self-
management and economic self-sufficiency; and
ii to advance the commercial and economic interests of Aboriginal
persons and Torres Strait Islanders by accumulating and using a
substantial capital asset for the benefit of the Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander peoples.
This was to be achieved largely by engaging in economic activitieswhich
focused on (s. 148):
i Encouraging and facilitating Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
participation in commercial projects and enterprises;
ii securing, as far as practicable, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
participation in the ownership and control of companies engaged in
activities that are likely to have a significant impact on Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander interests;
iii promoting the development of industries and other commercial and
economic activities that are likely to have a beneficial impact on
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander interests; and
iv making specialist commercial expertise available to Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander persons engaged in commercial activities.
The Act further states that the Corporation may enter into contracts; invest
its funds; purchase shares; form companies; act as trustees; and enter into
partnerships and joint ventures (s.152). Although it is forbidden to borrow
money for investment purposes (s.184), the Corporation may act as a
guarantor for others (s.153).
A statutory requirement of the Act (which was additional to those for the
former ADC) is that the CDC would, at all times, adhere to sound business
principles (s.148). In this the Act signals a change from former and
existing ATSIC policies, which mix social and commercial goals. By
emphasising an adherence to sound business principals, the Act aims to
ensure that the CDC will operate commercially.
The CDC's Corporate Plan for the period 1994-99 translates and
operationalises the statutory goals of the Act into the following (CDC
1995):
i To promote and participate in commercially viable and sound
ventures through ensuring the proper structure, security and
management of ventures;
ii to ensure that projects in which the Corporation is involved maximise
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander ownership, economic benefit,
income, management, training and employment; and to ensure that
any project development gives due consideration to local community,
cultural and environmental issues and to its social impact on lifestyles;
iii to ensure a diversity of investment activities to provide a balanced
portfolio to accommodate market fluctuations; and to ensure there is a
fair distribution of investments on a geographical basis according to
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander population numbers; and
iv to provide management policies, direction, resources and support
needed to achieve the earlier detailed goals, desired outcomes and
strategies in an effective and efficient manner.
The strategies in the CDC's Corporate Plan to achieve its goals include:
i The use of joint venture arrangements with partners with the
necessary expertise;
ii the use of management committees representing all ventures and
establishment of long-term relationships between partners and
managers;
iii active participation (by CDC) on all management committees;
iv joint control, reflected in equity structures and basis of returns; buy-
out provisions to transfer over time the Corporation's equity to
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander group(s);
v assistance to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander group(s) to obtain
funding of initial equity. Liaison with ATSIC, Department of
Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs (DEETYA) and
other agencies supporting Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
employment and participation;
vi targeted activity to ensure investment opportunities are identified in
those States proportionally under-represented; and
vii targeted activity to identify and assess opportunities to diversify the
portfolio.
The goals of employment and of geographically distributing ventures to
reflect the distribution of the Indigenous populations are not specified in
the Act. However, these goals are not pursued by the Corporation if it is
thought they will jeopardise the commercial success of a venture (CDC
1995: 34; OEA 1995: 29). Following this commercial vein, and unlike
ATSIC and the former ADC, the Corporation does not provide
concessional loans or grants. The Corporation lends money to enable
Indigenous groups to become partners in joint ventures but it does so at
commercial rates. Further, whereas ATSIC's Business Funding Scheme
focuses on small businesses, the Corporation only considers projects
requiring a minimum investment of $0.5 million (ATSIC 1994: 83). It is
also important to note that, as permitted by s.152 of the Act, the CDC has
adopted joint venturing with non-Indigenous partners as its major device
for facilitating Indigenous involvement in business. This strategy of
economic joint venturing represents a significant innovation in Indigenous
affairs.
Government support
To date, the CDC has received funding support from several sources.
When the Corporation was established in 1989, $22 million were
transferred from the former ADC. Then, over the four years to June 1994,
it received a further $10 million per year from the Commonwealth
Government. ATSIC has also provided some $2.6 million in grants from
its Business Funding Scheme to increase the debt-free equity of Indigenous
partners in joint ventures (ATSIC 1995: 45). Apart from these subventions
the Corporation is required to cover its operating costs and generate
ongoing venture capital from its investments. That is to say, the
Corporation must self-finance its operations rather than depend on an
annual injection of funds from government. Again, this facet of the CDC's
operations represents a significant departure from earlier Indigenous
programs which relied on ongoing government financing and tends to
locate the Corporation more in the business than in the bureaucratic arena.
Operations and structures
The Corporation operates with a board of nine part-time directors
appointed by the Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs,
to whom the Corporation is also ultimately answerable (CDC 1995: 5, 12).
Five of the board, including the Chair, must be Indigenous and at least one
of these an ATSIC Commissioner.1 In 1994-95 there were three non-
Indigenous directors and six Indigenous directors (two of whom were
ATSIC Commissioners). The Act (s.157) states that each director must
satisfy the Minister that they have experience in industry, commerce or
finance.2 It is clear from the composition of the Board that the non-
Indigenous members were selected for their high profile in the business
world and for the business and economic expertise they could bring to the
Board: one was a professor of accounting at the University of New South
Wales, a second was the Managing Director of Medicare and Medibank
Private3 and the third was the former General Manager of the
Commonwealth Development Bank of Australia. At June 1995, the
Corporation had five professional staff and six support staff, all operating
out of the Corporation's office in Canberra.
The Act states that the Board's function is to determine policy and ensure
the efficient performance of the Corporation (s.156). In fact the Board
reviews the status of current projects and approves proposals for new
projects. Approval of projects rests on a number of conditions which
include that they be commercially sound and able to accommodate
Indigenous partners or involvement. Also, as noted earlier, the Corporation
expects to make an investment of at least $0.5 million in any project it is
involved in.
The Board receives proposals from a variety of sources. Between 1993 and
1995 the majority were from Indigenous groups and individuals, while few
were from ATSIC or industry groups (OEA 1995: 28). A protocol has
recently been drawn up between the Corporation and ATSIC - and others
are being developed with State and Territory governments - which may
facilitate more proposals from these bodies (CDC 1995: 22, 23). In the two
years to 1995 an estimated 40 per cent of all proposals were from non-
Indigenous sources. Indeed, one of the Corporation's largest and most
promising joint ventures (with the Henry Walker Group) was initiated by
its non-Indigenous partners (see below).
The portfolio of activities
The Corporation's portfolio of activities (at mid-1995) is listed in Tables 1
and 2. The portfolio consists of three categories of activity: cash
management and investment; CDC entities; and joint ventures. In terms of
Indigenous participation and equity, the joint ventures are the most
significant part of the portfolio. However, given the requirement to
generate its own operating funds, it is important that each section of the
portfolio provides a return to the Corporation.
Cash management and investment
Cash management and investments amount to $26 million, representing 42
per cent of the CDC's total allocations. Over $20 million of this is in bank
deposits, bonds and marketable securities and it can be argued that such a
sizeable cash deposit runs counter to one the CDC's principal goals
because it ties up capital that could be used to assist Indigenous people into
business ventures. This situation may reflect a lack of good investment
opportunities or an inability by the Corporation to seek or respond to
opportunities because of insufficient staff (OEA 1995: 29).
On the other hand, having a certain proportion of funds on deposit is good
financial practice as it balances the portfolio and provides a risk-free and
satisfactory rate of return. In this regard, the deposit is complying with the
Act which charges the Corporation with accumulating and using a
substantial capital asset for the benefit of Indigenous people (s.146). The
returns on the cash investment were high in 1990-91 but the Corporation
was unable to 'unwind1 its position when there was an unfavourable
movement in the rates of bonds and marketable securities in 1993 and, as a
result, this section of the portfolio incurred a loss of $1.5 million (OEA
1995: 19). In any event, the Corporation intends reducing the cash deposit
to around $13 million as further business ventures are initiated (OEA 1995:
29; CDC 1995: 36).
Table 1. Cash management, investment and entities, June 1995.
CDC's investment
Project $ million
Cash management and investment
Bank term deposits, bonds, and convertible notes 20.70
Convertible notes and shares in Henry Walker Group 4.30
CDC Entities
Bonner House, retail complex 14.31
Torres Strait housing development 0.62
Ngarrindjeri Orchard (almond/citrus orchard) 0.11
Source: CDC (1995); OEA (1995).
The other element of cash management consists of just over $4 million
dollars worth of convertible notes and shares with the Henry Walker
mining group. Part of the rationale for this investment is strategic, as it
provides the CDC with the opportunity to take up contracts in the Henry
Walker Group's projects on land in which Indigenous people have an
interest (see below) (CDC 1995: 40).
CDC entities
The second portfolio category, CDC entities, consists of ventures or
subsidiaries which are owned entirely by the Corporation. There are
presently three of these,to which the Corporation has committed just over
$15 million, or 25 per cent of its capital. These entities are existing
businesses which the Corporation has purchased or they are ventures which
the Corporation has established to take advantage of a niche in the market.
The long-term goal is to identify Indigenous groups who would become
partners with the CDC. However, the first of this group - shown in Table 1
- is Bonner House, a retail and office complex in Canberra inherited from
the former ADC in 1990. The CDC owns and manages the building, in
which its offices are located, and there are presently no plans to involve
any Indigenous partners in the venture.
Joint ventures
The third category of activity in the portfolio is joint venturing (Table 2).
Joint ventures can be either bilateral or trilateral: the CDC may joint
venture with Indigenous groups or non-Indigenous businesses or with both.
The rationale behind joint venturing is mixed. Indigenous groups are
generally poorly skilled, especially in management, and joint venturing
allows the CDC and/or the non-Indigenous partner to contribute their
management skills to the project. Ideally, over time, with this support and
with input from the various training agencies, the Indigenous partners
develop their own business and technical skills. Joint venturing with an
established non-Indigenous business also secures Indigenous people a
place in an existing market and reduces their financial risk by utilising the
venture capital of the other partner. This section of the portfolio has the
greatest potential for increasing Indigenous involvement in business but
also requires the greatest investment of the Corporation's human resources.
Of the 16 joint ventures, ten are trilateral; four are bilateral between the
CDC and an Indigenous group; one is bilateral between the CDC and a
non-Indigenous company; and one is bilateral between Indigenous and
non-Indigenous partners. In the bilateral partnerships between Indigenous
groups and the Corporation, the Indigenous equity varies between 2 per
cent and 54 per cent. In all of the ventures (with the exception of Tjapukai
Park), the Indigenous partners and the CDC together have a minimum 50
per cent equity
Table 2. Joint ventures, June 1995.
Project
Burnie K-Mart
Retail complex
Homestead Retail
Retail complex
Barra Base
Tourist fishing lodge
Ampiji Cairns Art
Airport art shop
Western White Linen
Laundry
Katherine Cruises
Tourist cruises
Kings Canyon
Tourist resort
Kittle Toyota
Car dealer
Carpentaria Shipping
Mine shipping service
Mt Todd
Mining contractor
Sunwood Timber
Treated timber
Ceduna Oysters
Oyster lease
Marine Oysters
Oyster leases (two)
Palm Island Ferry
Passenger ferry
Furneaux Oysters
Oyster lease
Tjapukai Park
Cultural theme park
Indigenous
54.0
30.0
2.0
50.0
0.0
50.0
23.8
16.7
25.0
25.0
12.5
25.0
12.5
30.0
45.0
18.2
Ownership
Per cent
CDC Non-Indigenous
46.0
70.0
98.0
50.0
50.0
0.0
27.7
33.3
25.0
25.0
37.5
25.0
37.5
40.0
10.0
26.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
50.0
50.0
48.5
50.0
50.0
50.0
50.0
50.0
50.0
30.0
45.0
55.1
CDC's
investment
$ million
3.00
1.18
0.05
0.17
0.58
0.85
1.83
1.13
2.26
1.60
1.85
0.80
2.02
0.56
0.03
2.43
Source: CDC (1995); OEA (1995).
Goals and future directions
In 1995, the OEA was charged with evaluating the efficiency and
effectiveness of the Corporation (OEA 1995). The issues covered included
the rates of return on the CDC's investments; the levels of Indigenous
equity and employment in joint ventures; the number of staff and their
responsibilities and duties; and the implications of the hands-on
management assistance that the Corporation provides to joint ventures
(OEA 1995: 33).
The OEA found that the financial rates of return were mixed (but tended to
be low); that levels of Indigenous equity were not improving significantly;
but that a moderate number of Indigenous people were employed in the
ventures (some 52 Indigenous people had jobs in nine of the joint
ventures). While the efficiency of the Corporation's staff was not
questioned, it was thought that the staffing levels were not adequate to
successfully meet the work-load. Further, the management and other
assistance provided by the CDC was identified as a cost not normally
encountered by mainstream development corporations. However, the
report also showed that the rates of return had been affected by some
factors outside the CDC's control. For example, Bonner House had been
transferred to the Corporation at an inflated value and in a condition that
required an expenditure of $10 million to make it marketable and
habitable. Also, the OEA noted that in some ventures returns would only
be realised in the longer term, after a period of prolonged development.
On the whole, the OEA report was able to explain why certain conditions
relating to the Corporation's commercial performance and efficiency
existed and it made recommendations to alleviate the situation. For
example, the report recommended additional staffing and that the cost of
managerial assistance be factored into the Corporation's project appraisals.
The OEA review was not asked to consider broader policy issues
associated with the CDC's operations. Some of these are discussed here.
Revisiting the Act
Although legislation can be open to more than one interpretation, it seems
that the Act both reflects earlier policy themes and indicates new
directions. First, while the intention is to continue to involve Indigenous
people in businesses, the Act states that this should be as owners or
controllers (s.148), suggesting that a goal is to create a class of
entrepreneurs or business managers. Second, the Act states that the
Corporation should involve itself in industries which might have a
significant impact on, and be beneficial to, the lives of Indigenous people
(s.148), indicating that the Corporation should target specific industries for
its investments. Third, the Act requires the Corporation to act in
accordance with sound business principles (s.148), which clearly locates it
in the commercial world.
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Indigenous entrepreneurs
If a goal is to create Indigenous entrepreneurs, then a mechanism is
required which can measure this outcome. Definitions of entrepreneur are
contentious and sometimes mix functions, such as risk taking and
recognising market opportunities, with those that might be considered
more managerial, such as organising staff and dealing with bureaucracies
(Kilby 1971: 27; Wilken 1979: 57; Fairbairn 1988: 17, 27, 28). A clear
distinction between the characteristics of entrepreneurs and managers will
vary, depending on whether the ultimate aim of the CDC is to create one
rather than the other. The proportion of all Indigenous people who are
either self-employed or who are employed as managers is very low (Daly
1994) and so an increase in the numbers employed in either category could
be viewed positively from a policy perspective.
At this stage, there are insufficient data to clearly indicate to what extent
the Corporation's activities are creating either entrepreneurs or business
managers. As noted above, nine of the CDC's joint ventures had produced
jobs for 52 Indigenous people but this tells us little about the category of
the employment (OEA 1995: 28). Indigenous partners participate on the
Boards of Management of all joint ventures (OEA 1995: 25) but it is
unclear if these are paid or unpaid, or full-time or part-time, positions. The
extent to which entrepreneurial or managerial skills are being transferred to
the Indigenous partners of joint ventures will be influenced by the degree
and form of their involvement.
Although definitions of what constitutes an entrepreneur vary, there seems
to be broad agreement that entrepreneurs take economic risks and have
economic incentives (McClelland and Winter 1970). This raises the
question of whether the Indigenous partners are subjected to similar
degrees of risk as is normally the case in the business world. To date,
Indigenous equity in joint ventures has come either from CDC loans or
ATSIC grants and this mix of types of financing is little different from that
available to purely non-Indigenous businesses. However, the extent to
which the Indigenous partners are fully exposed to financial responsibility
is not clear. There is a view in the development economics literature,
however, which holds that the policy measures which seek to encourage
the often slow development of entrepreneurial activity should actually aim
to reduce risk (Baumol 1968). If the Corporation adopted this latter view,
then it would be justified in protecting the Indigenous partners from the
full effects of financial risk, at least during a developmental period.
The direct benefits from joint ventures that might provide the incentive for
the Indigenous partners to act as entrepreneurs are limited and intangible.
For instance, returns from the ventures have, to date, not been distributed
as a dividend but have been diverted to repay the CDC's original equity
loan or redeem the CDC's equity. Although this process transfers
ownership to the Indigenous partners (as in the case of house purchase), it
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occurs over an extended period and reduces the tangible financial benefits.
This extended horizon has resulted in some negativity towards the
enterprises on the part of the Indigenous partners, which could possibly be
reduced by increasing debt-free equity funding by, for example, accessing
ATSIC grants (OEA 1995: 25). Also, although it can be argued that the
CDC's focus should be on creating entrepreneurs (and business managers)
and not on employment per se, any kind of real employment will represent
a form of direct and short-term financial return which can help maintain
Indigenous incentive. In this case, the Corporation would be required to
specify and to measure the two kinds of outcomes: long-term and short-
term.4
Although there is nothing in the Act that precludes the CDC from
establishing joint ventures with individuals or families, the present
Indigenous partners are all organisations which in some cases represent a
large number of communities. It is unclear how this form of ownership
affects incentive and, for example, how future benefits would be
distributed and to whom. For the last 20 years there has been a tendency
within government to view the community or larger group as the unit of
Indigenous development and there is often considerable political pressure
to establish businesses with some form of collective ownership. However,
there is evidence to show that in some cases it is more appropriate for the
owners of businesses to be smaller family groups (Arthur 1992, 1994b: 14;
Fairbairn 1988: 29). This can apply in rural areas, where people reside in
discrete Indigenous communities, as well as in urban areas. Community-
based businesses in the non-Indigenous arena invariably have a strong
philosophical base which includes the understanding that they may be not-
for-profit or that benefits will accrue to all of those involved or be
reinvested to produce long-term gains such as employment. This
philosophy is not fully developed in the Indigenous arena and tensions are
often generated because of misunderstandings about who should and can
have control of and share in resources (Altman forthcoming). Such
tensions have the potential to confuse entrepreneurial objectives and this
factor should be considered on a case-by-case basis when determining the
appropriate Indigenous unit of ownership for various ventures. It is
unlikely that the larger incorporated group will be the unit of ownership to
stimulate and maintain economic initiative in every case.
Although little relevant research has been carried out in Australia, case
studies from other locations indicate that in some instances cultural traits
and social mores can influence Indigenous entrepreneurial activity.5 For
instance, while in Papua New Guinea some groups see success in business
as a way of attaining personal prestige, the conservative leadership in Fiji
is more interested in politics and administration than in helping local
people to develop commercially (Fairbairn 1988: 26). Analyses of
Indigenous businesses in Australia have noted that these often fail due to
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financial difficulties or poor management (OEA 1991; Arthur 1994a),
while in other instances failure apparently has been due to a perceived
conflict of values. For example, in some cases community leaders and
members have disagreed over whether resources should be used for
traditional rather than business activities (Gerritsen 1982; Ellanna 1988;
Arthur 1994b). Although many of these examples highlight a conflict of
values within Indigenous communities rather than complete rejection of
entrepreneurship per se (Arthur 1994b), such conflict has the potential to
undermine efforts to foster entrepreneurship.
Strategic investment
It was argued above that the intent of the Act was to involve Indigenous
people in projects in specific industries. In discussing progress towards
achieving this goal, it may be useful to consider two stylised categories of
project within the field of commercial development. One category would
include projects where the gains are short-term and direct (such as
employment), which have limited strategic influence and which are in
industries that have a low public profile. I propose that this is the category
of project which the Indigenous bureaucracies have focused on in the past
and which is characterised by the term 'enterprise'. A second category
would include larger-scale projects in which the gains are long-term and
which present a strategic position within industries that have a relatively
high public profile and/or which generate regional economic and political
leverage. This category of project would be characterised by notions of
long-term gains and strategic investment. I estimate that, including Bonner
House, out of 21 ventures just under half (those in mining and tourism)
could be placed in the strategic category (Table 3).
The mining and tourism projects have been classified as strategic because
they are in industries considered to have a high public and political profile
and they involve land. This classification can be considered subjective but
a brief note on two of the joint ventures (Table 2) will indicate their
strategic nature and their potential for long-term gains. The Mt Todd
mining contract in the Northern Territory is a joint venture between the
Jawoyn people, the CDC and the Henry Walker mining group. Henry
Walker first approached the CDC in 1993 with a view to jointly purchasing
an engineering company in Western Australia (Ryan 1996: 2). A bid was
worked up but for a number of financial reasons it was not submitted and
the project did not eventuate. However, because of the relationship formed,
Henry Walker decide to continue the association and offered the
Corporation the opportunity to become equity shareholders, including an
undertaking to provide on the job training to Indigenous people in their
projects wherever possible (Ryan 1996: 3). In taking up this offer, the CDC
purchased $3.5 million worth of convertible notes representing a stake of 8
per cent in the Henry Walker group (The Australian 12 July 1993). (The
CDC increased its equity in the Henry Walker group during 1994-95 when
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it purchased an additional $1 million worth of shares.) Also in 1993, the
Jawoyn people agreed not to lodge native title claims over the land on
which the Mt Todd mine is located, in return for a package of concessions
from the mine owners and the Northern Territory Government in, for
example, education and employment.
Table 3. The elements of the CDC portfolio.
Non-strategic Strategic
Financial Mining
Bank deposits Henry Walker notes
Henry Walker shares
Property Carpentaria Shipping
Bonner House Mt Todd
Torres Strait Housing
Burnie K Mart Tourism
Homestead Retail Barra Base
Barra Base
Aquaculture Ampiji Art
Ngarrindjeri Kings Canyon
Ceduna Oysters Katherine Cruise
Marine Oysters Tjapukai Park
Furneaux Oysters
Manufacture
Sunwood Timber
Retail
Kittle Toyota
Service
Western Linen
Palm Island Ferry
Source: CDC (1995); OEA (1995).
At about the same time, and as a direct spin-off to the Mt Todd agreement,
the Jawoyn people, the CDC and Henry Walker held consultations with a
view to forming a joint venture to undertake work at the mine (Altman
1994: 13; Ryan 1996: 4). Henry Walker had considered tendering
independently but, as they believed that it was necessary to form a good
relationship with the local Indigenous people, they saw the advantage in a
trilateral joint venture of this kind. The CDC played a central role in the
negotiations for this to occur (Ryan 1996).
These arrangements at the Mt Todd mine presented the Burns Philp
shipping company with a model for their tender to the McArthur River
mine in the Gulf of Carpentaria. This resulted in the Carpentaria Shipping
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joint venture between Burns Philp, the Borroloola community and the
Corporation. Burns Philp intended tendering for a shipping contract with
the MeArthur River Mine (Altman 1994, 1995; Smith 1996) but felt that,
as in the Mt Todd case, the support of the local Indigenous people was
necessary for the bid to be viable. Furthermore, the company considered
that the combination of their technical expertise with the Corporation's
knowledge of the local Indigenous community would prove a strong
combination in their bid (Freund 1996: 5). After negotiations with the
CDC the joint venture was formed.
These two joint ventures attracted a great deal of positive press coverage
and it can be argued that this alone will create long-term benefits, such as
strengthening the position of Indigenous people to mount further joint
ventures and deals in the Northern Territory as well as in other parts of the
country. For example, in the cases described, the initial Mt Todd
agreement led to the Henry Walker joint venture, which itself was then
used as a model at McArthur River. The strategic long-term benefits that
can flow from these kinds of projects cannot easily be measured by an
evaluation such as that carried out by the OEA nor are they necessarily
observable in the short term. But they do appear to have some impact on
the Indigenous approach to the market. For example, after the Jawoyn
formed the joint venture with Mt Todd mine, they went on to break further
new ground in Indigenous relationships with the mining industry in the
region, by applying for membership of the Northern Territory Chamber of
Mines (Centralian Advocate Northern Territory 19 April 1994). The joint
ventures described above involved both the mining industry and land, and
they suggest the possibility of other strategic arrangements and alliances.
For instance, the CDC is now well placed to provide sound commercial
advice to organisations like the Indigenous Land Corporation, regional
land councils, Native Title Representative Bodies and regional royalty
associations. With both its established contacts in industry and its
commercial expertise, the Corporation could help devise and negotiate
some comprehensive regional economic strategies.
At present, the Corporation strives to balance its portfolio in two ways.
One way is designed to meet the commercial requirements of the Act
(s. 148) by spreading ventures across several industries to protect against
fluctuations in the market. The other is geographic, where the aim is to
distribute the ventures to reflect the distribution of the Indigenous
population (CDC 1995). Given that a significant proportion of the
Indigenous population reside in areas where commercial markets are
depressed or non-existent (Taylor 1993a), this second notion of balance
must be driven by other than commercial objectives and can be viewed as
an impost.
Because the Indigenous population is not distributed according to market
forces but is spread across the country, then any attempt to locate projects
15
where people live can limit the CDC's freedom to take up the best
commercial opportunities. Also, this procedure results in projects being
distributed throughout the country, which greatly increases the effort
necessary to service them. In addition, levels of Indigenous education and
managerial skills, while generally low, are considerably lower in rural
areas, adding to the difficulty of fostering entrepreneurial and managerial
skills there.
The statistics show that Indigenous education and management skills are
lower than those of the non-Indigenous population (Taylor 1993b; Daly
1995) and the CDC is required to make up for this deficiency by assisting
prospective Indigenous partners to prepare proposals and to manage
established projects (CDC 1995). As noted earlier, the OEA recommended
that the cost of this assistance should be factored into project appraisals
(OEA 1995). While this proposal has some commercial rationale, the cost
referred to is the result of conditions in the Indigenous arena, is not one
that non-Indigenous development agencies have to bear and so can be
regarded as an extra development cost. It seems unreasonable that this
extra cost should be borne by the Corporation in the name of
commerciality.
I
The government does not provide ongoing financial support to the
Corporation, which must therefore self-finance its operations. In addition,
the Act stipulates that the Corporation cannot borrow funds for investment
purposes (s.183). These conditions risk limiting the Corporation's access to
investment capital and may restrict its ability to take up commercial
opportunities. Also, the restrictions appear somewhat contradictory. On the
one hand, the Corporation is required to operate as a self-financing
business but, on the other, it is restricted from borrowing investment
capital.
Summary
The OEA review described the Corporation as unique on the grounds of its
mix of financial activities. It is worthwhile noting that its uniqueness in the
area of Australian Indigenous affairs also stems from its commercial
approach and its strategy of joint venturing, a strategy also adopted by
other Indigenous organisations overseas (Ruffing 1979; Fairbairn 1988;
Maori Development Corporation 1993; Young 1995).
The CDC represents an attempt on the part of the government to integrate
the Indigenous people more fully into the business world. In this regard the
CDC is required to generate its own funds, demonstrate that its ventures
are profitable and, it is argued here, demonstrate that the Indigenous
partners are becoming skilled as entrepreneurs or business managers.
However, the Corporation is not divorced from the political and social
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realities of Indigenous affairs which, it can be argued, limit its freedom to
act as commercially as it otherwise might and impose on it additional
costs. In particular, there is a non-commercial demand to locate projects
where Indigenous people live; the units of Indigenous ownership are often
communal and large; the CDC must bear the cost of supporting an
unskilled client group; it is not provided ongoing funding; and it is not
permitted to borrow investment capital.
At the beginning of this paper it was noted that one reason the earlier
enterprise programs had failed was that they had mixed and contradictory
(social and commercial) goals. In many respects, the Corporation's goals
are also mixed and, given the status of the socioeconomic position of the
Indigenous population, this may be acceptable and unavoidable. Indeed, it
is not unusual for development agencies to have multiple social and
commercial goals which must be reconciled and balanced. However, it
seems unreasonable that the CDC should have to pursue social goals, have
to pay for doing this out of its own returns and, at the same time, have to
generate further investment capital.
The policy implications of this are that a true and full evaluation of the
CDC should include an estimate of the commercial cost of the
Corporation's non-commercial operations and goals. This procedure was
hinted at in the OEA's recommendation, noted earlier, that the cost of the
CDC's support functions should be factored into its project appraisals
(OEA 1995). However, what is proposed here is that a system should be
devised to determine all of the CDC's non-commercial costs on a case-by-
case basis and that these non-commercial development costs should be
borne by a government subsidy. This would require taking more of a 'cost-
benefit' approach to the CDC's accounting procedures. Indeed, it can be
argued this approach should be adopted for all of the government's
Indigenous enterprise programs which have a mixture of social and
commercial goals, as this would clarify the extent to which the social
objectives may impact on the commercial objectives. Put simply, if the
intention is to continue to pursue social goals within commercial ventures,
then these goals should be clearly identified and costed.
The Corporation's principal device for assisting Indigenous people into the
business world is joint venturing. This is an innovative device and, from
the portfolio, the results look impressive. However, I have argued here that
implicit in the legislation is that the CDC's operations will produce a group
of entrepreneurs or business managers. From the data available at this
stage, it is not clear if this is occurring. Further, even where employment
may have been generated, it is unclear what category of employment it is -
for example, whether it is skilled or unskilled. If there is a genuine desire
to create entrepreneurs or business managers, or indeed any category of
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skilled employment, then a strategy must be devised to measure if this is
occurring over time.
However, as indicated by the portfolio, the strategy of joint venturing has
enabled the CDC to involve Indigenous people in a wide range of
industries and project types. It is also a useful device for enabling the
Corporation and/or an experienced non-Indigenous partner to provide
business support to the developing Indigenous partners. Importantly, this
strategy also increases the contact between Indigenous and non-Indigenous
business people and so may help alleviate some racial tensions and also
break down some of the racial stereotypes that have the potential to inhibit
economic self-sufficiency. However, methodologies are now required
which can indicate to what extent joint venturing, and the work of the CDC
in general, are furthering Indigenous self-management and economic self-
sufficiency, which are the main goals of the Corporation's legislation.
Notes
1. The former ADC had a part-time Board of ten Indigenous people all appointed by
the Governor-General.
2. There was no requirement for the directors of the former ADC to have formal
business or economic experience.
3. Medicare and Medibank Private are two of the country's major health insurance
schemes.
4. The notion of incentive has implications for all forms of work whether as an
employer or an employee. Structural and cultural influences on the incentive to
work can include the disincentive of the social security system and the propensity
of Indigenous people to target work; that is, to work only when they have a
specific financial demand (Peterson 1985; Altman 1987; Arthur 1991; Altman,
Arthur and Bek 1994).
5. Recent reports have noted the lack of data on Indigenous businesses in Australia
(see for example OEA 1991; ATSIC 1994).
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